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Nieves v. Bartlett  
 
Ruling Below: Nieves v. Bartlett, 712 Fed.Appx. 613 (9th Cir. 2017) 
 
Overview: Bartlett sued under § 1983 claiming that the officers who arrested him for disorderly 
conduct and harassment had no probable cause for arrest. The arrest occurred at a party where the 
police officers, Nieves and Weight, interpreted Bartlett’s body language as “hostile” resulting in 
his arrest and placement in the "drunk tank." Bartlett was charged with disorderly conduct and 
resisting arrest. 
 
Issue: Whether probable cause defeats a First Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. 
RUSSELL P. BARTLETT, Plaintiff- Appellant 
v. 
LUIS A. NIEVES, in his personal capacity and BRYCE L. WEIGHT, in his personal 
capacity, Defendants-Appellees 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit 
 
Decided on October 20, 2017 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
Before WARDLAW, CLIFTON, and 
OWENS, Circuit Judges.  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant Russell P. Bartlett 
appeals the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment to Alaska state trooper Defendants-
Appellees Luis A. Nieves and Bryce L. 
Weight on his § 1983 claims of false arrest, 
excessive force, malicious prosecution, and 
retaliatory arrest. We review the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. 
Garcia v. Cty. of Merced, 639 F.3d 1206, 
1208 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm in part and 
reverse in part. 
 
1. We affirm the district court’s grant 
of summary judgment to the defendants on 
plaintiff’s false arrest claim on the ground of 
qualified immunity. A two-part test applies to 
qualified immunity claims. Construing the 
facts in the light most favorable to the party 
alleging injury, the court must evaluate: 1) 
whether the officer violated a constitutional 
right; and 2) whether that right was clearly 
established at the time of the officer’s 
actions. See Lal v. California, 746 F.3d 112, 
116 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Pearson v. 
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). 
 
Adopting Bartlett’s version of the 
facts, we agree with the district court that 
defendants had at least arguable probable 
cause to arrest Bartlett for harassment, 
disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, or assault 
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under Alaska law. When Sergeant Nieves 
initiated Bartlett’s arrest, he knew that 
Bartlett had been drinking, and he observed 
Bartlett speaking in a loud voice and standing 
close to Trooper Weight. He also saw 
Trooper Weight push Bartlett back. Although 
Bartlett may have his own explanations for 
his actions, these explanations were not 
known to Sergeant Nieves; the test is whether 
“the information the officer had at the time of 
making the arrest” gave rise to probable 
cause. John v. City of El Monte, 515 F.3d 936, 
940 (9th Cir. 2008). We agree with the 
district court that it did; a reasonable officer 
in Sergeant Nieves’s position could have 
concluded that Bartlett stood close to Trooper 
Weight and spoke loudly in order to 
“challenge” him, provoking Trooper Weight 
to push him back. See Alaska Stat. § 
11.61.120(a)(1). Therefore, we affirm the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment to 
the troopers on Bartlett’s false arrest claim. 
 
2. We affirm the district court’s grant 
of summary judgment to the troopers on 
Bartlett’s excessive force claim on the 
ground of qualified immunity. In particular, 
Bartlett has failed to point to a case that 
clearly establishes that the troopers’ limited 
use of force to effect his arrest was 
unconstitutional. Bartlett’s references to 
Young v. County of Los Angeles, 655 F.3d 
1156 (9th Cir. 2011), and Blankenhorn v. 
City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 2007), 
are unavailing. In the present case, the 
troopers reacted quickly to a fluid situation 
and were faced with the undisputedly 
challenging circumstances of Arctic Man. 
These circumstances were not present in 
Young and Blankenhorn. Because the second 
prong of the qualified immunity test requires 
“a case where an officer acting under similar 
circumstances . . . was held to have violated 
the Fourth Amendment,” and we are not 
aware of any such case, we agree with the 
district court that the officers are entitled to 
qualified immunity on Bartlett’s excessive 
force claim. See White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 
548, 552 (2017) (instructing that clearly 
established law must be “particularized” to 
the facts of the case). 
 
3. We also affirm the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment on Bartlett’s 
malicious prosecution claim. To prevail on 
his malicious prosecution claim, Bartlett 
must show that the troopers prosecuted him: 
1) with malice; 2) without probable cause; 
and 3) for the purpose of denying him a 
specific constitutional right. Freeman v. City 
of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 
1995). Because we conclude that the officers 
had probable cause to arrest Bartlett, we 
affirm the grant of summary judgment to the 
troopers on this claim. 
 
4. We reverse the district court’s 
dismissal of Bartlett’s retaliatory arrest 
claim. The district court dismissed this claim 
on the ground that the troopers had probable 
cause to arrest Bartlett. However, we have 
previously held that a plaintiff can prevail on 
a retaliatory arrest claim even if the officers 
had probable cause to arrest. See Ford v. City 
of Yakima, 706 F.3d 1188, 1195–96 (9th Cir. 
2013) “[A]n individual has a right to be free 
from retaliatory police action, even if 
probable cause existed for that action.”). 
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The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658 (2012), 
does not foreclose this result. In Reichle, the 
Court noted that it had not previously 
recognized a First Amendment right to be 
free from a retaliatory arrest supported by 
probable cause, but did not conclude that a 
plaintiff must show lack of probable cause to 
make a retaliatory arrest claim. Id. at 664–65. 
Indeed, the Court emphasized that the rule 
that it announced in Hartman v. Moore, 547 
U.S. 250 (2006), which held that a plaintiff 
cannot make a retaliatory prosecution claim 
if the charges were supported by probable 
cause, does not necessarily extend to 
retaliatory arrests. Reichle, 566 U.S. at 666–
70.  
 
We have since clarified that in the 
Ninth Circuit, a plaintiff can make a 
retaliatory arrest claim even if the arresting 
officers had probable cause. When the 
troopers arrested Bartlett at Arctic Man in 
2014, it was clearly established that “an 
individual has a right to be free from 
retaliatory police action, even if probable 
cause existed for that action.” Ford, 706 F.3d 
at 1195–96. Therefore, the district court erred 
in concluding that Bartlett’s retaliatory arrest 
claim fails simply because the troopers had 
probable cause to arrest him. 
 
Bartlett has potentially established a 
claim of retaliatory arrest in violation of the 
First Amendment because 1) he has 
“demonstrate[d] that the officers’ conduct 
would chill a person of ordinary firmness 
from future First Amendment activity” and 2) 
the evidence that he has advanced would 
enable him “ultimately to prove that the 
officers’ desire to chill his speech was a but-
for cause of their allegedly unlawful 
conduct.” Id. at 1193. 
 
Regarding the first prong of the test, 
we have held that an arrest in retaliation for 
the exercise of free speech is sufficient to 
chill speech. Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 
F.3d 896, 917 (9th Cir. 2012). Regarding the 
second prong, we have held that, once a 
plaintiff has provided “sufficient evidence for 
a jury to find that the officers’ retaliatory 
motive was a but-for cause of their action,” 
“the issue of causation ultimately should be 
determined by a trier of fact.” Ford, 706 F.3d 
at 1194. Construing the facts in the light most 
favorable to Bartlett, he has advanced 
sufficient evidence to meet this standard. 
Most importantly, Bartlett alleged that 
Sergeant Nieves said “bet you wish you 
would have talked to me now” after his arrest. 
This statement, if true, could enable a 
reasonable jury to find that Sergeant Nieves 
arrested Bartlett in retaliation for his refusal 
to answer Sergeant Nieves’s questions earlier 
in the evening. We therefore conclude that 
the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment for the troopers on Bartlett’s 
retaliatory arrest claim. 
 
Each party to bear its own costs. 
 
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN 
PART, AND REMANDED.  
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“Supreme Court Trying Again on the First Amendment Retaliatory Arrest 
Question: The question that the Court didn't resolve in Lozman v. Riviera-Beach is 
back, in another case on which the Supreme Court just granted” 
 
 
Reason 
 
Eugene Volokh 
 
June 28, 2018 
   
This past Term's Lozman v. Riviera-
Beach was expected to resolve a hugely 
important question: Can someone sue for 
retaliatory arrest if he there was probable 
cause to arrest him for some fairly petty 
crime, but there's lots of reason to think that 
he wouldn't have been arrested if it weren't 
for his past constitutionally protected speech? 
The Court resolved the case on very narrow 
grounds, limited to the rare cases where 
plaintiff can show a municipal policy of 
going after him because of his speech. But the 
Court just agreed to hear a new case, Nieves 
v. Bartlett, that involves the broader issue; the 
Court will presumably decide the question 
this coming year. Here are the facts of the 
case as described in the state's petition for 
certiorari: 
Every spring, thousands of extreme skiers, 
snowmobilers, and spectators gather in the 
remote Hoodoo Mountains of interior Alaska 
for Arctic Man, a multi-day festival centered 
around a high-speed ski and snowmobile 
race. Campers congregate at night to drink 
and party, and rampant alcohol use 
compounds safety concerns at the event. 
On the last day of Arctic Man in 2014, 
Troopers Luis Nieves and Bryce Weight 
were on duty, patrolling a large outdoor party 
where minors appeared to be drinking 
alcohol. Nieves encountered respondent 
Russell Bartlett at the party and attempted to 
speak with him, but Bartlett declined to talk 
to Nieves. Meanwhile, Trooper Weight 
spotted a minor who appeared to be drinking 
alcohol and began speaking to him at the edge 
of the crowd. Bartlett marched up to Weight, 
loudly demanding that Weight stop talking to 
the minor. 
The district court, reviewing video footage of 
the incident, found that "Trooper Weight, Mr. 
Bartlett, and the minor [were] standing very 
close together exchanging words" and that 
"Bartlett's right hand was at roughly shoulder 
height within inches of Trooper Weight's 
face." The 5′9″, 240-pound Bartlett, who at 
the time of the incident was too intoxicated to 
drive, later maintained that his close 
proximity to Trooper Weight and loud voice 
were appropriate given the volume of music 
at the party, but Trooper Weight viewed 
Bartlett's "escalating voice, his look of anger, 
[and] his body language" as "hostile" "pre-
assault indicators." To create a safe space for 
himself, Trooper Weight placed his open 
palms on Bartlett's chest and pushed him 
back. 
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Trooper Nieves, believing that Bartlett posed 
a danger to Weight, ran to help. Following a 
struggle, the troopers were able to subdue and 
arrest Bartlett. 
He was released without injury after a few 
hours in the "drunk tank." Bartlett was 
charged with disorderly conduct and resisting 
arrest. The prosecution later dismissed the 
case for budgetary reasons, but the assigned 
prosecutor stated to the district court that he 
believed probable cause existed to charge 
Bartlett for disorderly conduct, resisting 
arrest, and assault. 
Bartlett sued Troopers Weight and Nieves, 
asserting [among other things] false arrest 
and imprisonment ... [and] retaliatory arrest 
.... On the false arrest and imprisonment 
claims, the [district] court ruled there was 
probable cause to arrest Bartlett for 
harassment, so the officers were entitled to 
summary judgment. The court ruled that the 
existence of probable cause also barred 
respondent's First Amendment retaliatory-
arrest claim, noting that this Court "has never 
recognized a First Amendment right to be 
free from a retaliatory arrest that is supported 
by probable cause." ... 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed on all claims 
except for retaliatory arrest. The appellate 
court ruled that the troopers had probable 
cause to arrest Bartlett for assault, disorderly 
conduct, harassment, and resisting arrest. 
Nevertheless, the court reiterated its earlier 
holding in Ford v. City of Yakima, 706 F.3d 
1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2013), that the existence 
of probable cause for an arrest does not bar a 
plaintiff's claim that the arrest was retaliatory 
in violation of the First Amendment. Pointing 
to respondent's allegation (uncorroborated by 
other witness testimony, audio or video 
recording) that Trooper Nieves said after the 
arrest, "Bet you wish you would have talked 
to me now," the court ruled that a jury might 
be persuaded that Bartlett was arrested for his 
earlier refusal to assist with the investigation, 
rather than for his harassing and belligerent 
conduct. The court thus reversed the grant of 
summary judgment on the retaliatory-arrest 
claim and remanded for trial.... 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
“Supreme Court allows retaliatory arrest lawsuit to move forward” 
 
 
The Washington Post 
 
Robert Barnes 
 
June 18, 2018 
 
The Supreme Court on Monday gave a civic 
activist in Florida another shot at proving that 
his arrest at a city council meeting was in 
retaliation for his criticism of public officials. 
 
The court said it was ruling narrowly for Fane 
Lozman, whose battles with the Riviera 
Beach City Council are legendary. It said a 
lower court had been wrong to stop his 
retaliation lawsuit. 
 
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for the 
court, said a citizen’s ability to criticize 
government without fear of retribution ranks 
“high in the hierarchy of First Amendment 
values.” 
 
But he wrote what even he described as a 
narrow ruling, sending the case back to a 
lower court and saying that Lozman will have 
to prove “the existence and enforcement of an 
official policy motivated by retaliation” on 
the part of the city council members. 
The vote was 8 to 1, with Justice Clarence 
Thomas dissenting. 
 
The court was particularly concerned about 
opening up individual police officers to 
lawsuits for making “split-second 
judgments” about whether an arrest is 
warranted, and it said this ruling did not 
affect that. 
Lozman in an interview called the ruling a 
“really big day for citizen-activists” and said 
it makes clear that municipalities are not 
immune to the law. He said he would be 
willing to settle the case in exchange for an 
apology from the city council — now very 
different from the one he initially sued — and 
reimbursement for legal fees. 
 
Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach grew from 
an attempt to cut off Lozman at a city council 
meeting into a major free-speech showdown. 
 
During the public comments at a meeting in 
November 2006, Lozman was talking, as he 
often did, about political corruption. The 
presiding council member told him to stop, 
and he refused. 
“Carry him out,” Elizabeth Wade told a 
police officer. Lozman was led away in 
handcuffs and spent hours in jail. The 
episode can be seen on YouTube. The court’s 
opinion included the link. 
 
Lozman was charged with disorderly conduct 
and resisting arrest without violence. A state 
prosecutor declined to pursue the charges, 
however, saying a conviction was unlikely. 
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Lozman filed a civil rights lawsuit against the 
city, saying the council violated his First 
Amendment rights with a retaliatory arrest. A 
recording of a private meeting council 
members attended months earlier showed 
that they had agreed to teach Lozman a 
lesson. 
 
But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th 
Circuit, which covers Florida, Georgia and 
Alabama, said that if the government can 
demonstrate a reasonable belief that any law 
was broken — probable cause — the 
retaliation claim cannot go forward. 
With disorderly conduct and resisting arrest 
out, prosecutors found an obscure Florida law 
that makes it a misdemeanor to interrupt or 
disturb “any school or any assembly of 
people met for the worship of God or for any 
lawful purpose.” 
 
It is possible that is what Lozman was about 
to do, the appeals court judge reasoned, and a 
jury agreed. Lozman’s complaint could not 
go forward. 
The Supreme Court years ago decided that a 
finding of probable cause barred a claim of 
retaliatory prosecution. So the question 
before the court was whether the same 
standard should be applied to arrests. 
 
This was Lozman’s second trip to the 
Supreme Court, a rarity when the cases 
present different questions of law. 
 
The first time he and the city met at the high 
court, the justices reviewed his claim that 
Riviera Beach had improperly used federal 
admiralty law to seize (and later destroy) his 
two-story plywood houseboat, with French 
doors, moored at the city marina. The court 
ruled 7 to 2 against the city, saying that 
Lozman’s houseboat was more house than 
boat and that admiralty law did not apply. 
 
Both cases were Lozman v. Riviera Beach. 
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“South Florida Activist is 2-0 at the Supreme Court after First Amendment 
victory” 
 
 
Miami Herald 
Alex Daugherty 
 
June 18, 2018 
 
A South Florida man just won a First 
Amendment victory at the Supreme Court in 
a case that could protect disgruntled citizens 
from arrest for voicing their displeasure at 
elected officials during public meetings. 
The nation's highest court ruled in favor of 
political gadfly Fane Lozman on Monday in 
a 8-1 decision, the culmination of more than 
a decade of work for Lozman after he was 
dragged out of a Riviera Beach city council 
meeting and arrested after speaking about the 
allegedly corrupt dealings of a Palm Beach 
County commissioner. 
Lozman is now 2-0 at the Supreme Court, an 
accomplishment that his lawyer said is 
unprecedented for an individual plaintiff in a 
court that rejects around 7,000 cases every 
year and hears only 80. He also won a 
maritime law case related to his floating 
home in 2013. 
"As far as I know he's the only person who's 
done it in recent times," said Pamela Karlan, 
an attorney from Stanford Law School who 
argued Lozman's case in front of the court. 
"There were people who got the same case 
twice to the Supreme Court, but not two 
different cases." 
 
The court's decision on Monday affects 
citizens who show up to public meetings to 
vent and question the actions of elected 
officials. If one official orders the arrest of 
someone speaking at a public meeting and the 
rest of the elected body doesn't object, the 
person arrested can now have a cause of 
action against the municipality if he or she 
can prove animosity. 
That means it's harder for angry elected 
officials to use their power to arrest people 
they simply don't like. 
"It's just been an amazing effort to try to crack 
the overbreadth of government power 
towards citizens who want to exercise their 
First Amendment rights," Lozman said in an 
interview on Monday. "This arrest happened 
in 2006 and the case was filed in February 
2008, so we've been fighting this case for 
over 10 years. It's been a Herculean effort." 
This isn't Lozman's first time in front of the 
Supreme Court. The semi-retired South 
Florida stock trader-turned First Amendment 
crusader also won a Supreme Court case in 
2012, when justices ruled 7-2 that Lozman's 
floating home was not a "vessel" and 
therefore not subject to the federal maritime 
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jurisdiction that eventually led local officials 
to seize and destroy it. 
Lozman was already victorious in his fight 
against Riviera Beach that led to his arrest in 
the first place. He saved other people's homes 
from being taken via eminent domain for a 
new private marina in Riviera Beach, and he 
was able to keep the public marina out of 
private hands. 
"I won the case today but I won what I really 
wanted years ago, which was the marina," 
Lozman said. "They didn't take the marina 
and the scum that tried to do that are out of 
power. We finally got the last one of those 
kicked out last month." 
But while his fellow citizens were able to 
keep their boats and homes on the marina, 
Lozman became consumed with his First 
Amendment fight for people like him who are 
thrown out of public meetings for needling 
elected officials. 
"I've heard horror stories from all over the 
country, people call me and they say they 
were physically thrown out of meetings. If 
you go on YouTube there’s lots of people 
being dragged out by elected officials and I 
wanted to stop that," Lozman said, adding 
that he worked between 8,000 and 9,000 
hours on his two Supreme Court cases. 
Karlan said it was Lozman's idea to pursue 
the First Amendment case as a potential 
Supreme Court pick. He approached the 
Stanford lawyers with his plan after doing the 
research on his own. 
"For years and years and years I'd work on 
these cases from 11 p.m. to 3 a.m., five days 
a week," Lozman said. "I taught myself the 
law. I think that this is almost like a kind of 
hobby, every night I kind of built the 
groundwork to have this case go to the next 
step. It became like building a boat, building 
this case." 
The ruling in Lozman's favor was narrow in 
the sense that it applied to elected boards and 
municipalities who boot speakers from their 
meetings. There were also questions within 
the lawsuit about people arrested by police 
during events like protests who are not 
engaged in the act itself, such as journalists 
and bystanders. Those questions weren't part 
of the Supreme Court's decision. 
"Basically, they made a distinction between 
individual police officers and the decision of 
the municipality," Lozman said. "We didn't 
have the facts (to make a broader First 
Amendment challenge). They gave it to us 
but they didn’t give it to the media. I'm 
looking for a member of the media to move 
this issue forward." 
Lozman said the ruling was a "dream come 
true" and that he was happy to win by a larger 
margin on Monday than in 2012. Clarence 
Thomas was the only justice to rule against 
Lozman. 
"I’m thrilled, I'm glad [Justice Anthony] 
Kennedy voted for me this time," Lozman 
said. "Last time he dissented and I'm glad he 
came around." 
Lozman said he will continue to advocate on 
First Amendment issues and is still fighting 
in the courts on who will pay for about 
$230,000 in legal fees. 
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But today was the culmination of 12 years of 
hard work. 
"I just think my dream came true. I knew 
what happened to me was wrong and I never 
thought I’d have to go all the way to the 
Supreme Court to make things right," 
Lozman said. 
"I helped move the bar forward on the First 
Amendment." 
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“Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach and First Amendment Retaliatory Arrest 
Damages Claims: The Court Again Sidesteps the Probable Cause Issue” 
 
 
Nahmod Law Blog 
 
Sheldon Nahmod 
 
July 19, 2018 
 
In Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S. 
Ct. — (2018), the Supreme Court once again 
avoided ruling generally on the question 
whether a section 1983 plaintiff who alleges 
a retaliatory arrest in violation of the First 
Amendment must allege and prove the 
absence of probable cause in addition to 
impermissible First Amendment motive. Or, 
to put it another way, whether probable cause 
to arrest is a defense to a First Amendment 
retaliatory arrest damages claim. Instead, it 
ruled narrowly for the plaintiff based on the 
particular facts of his case. 
 
In Lozman, the plaintiff alleged that a city 
(through its policymakers) had him arrested 
in retaliation for the exercise of his First 
Amendment rights. He claimed that he was 
arrested at a city council meeting when he got 
up to speak because he previously had 
criticized the city’s eminent domain 
redevelopment efforts and had also sued the 
city for violating the state’s Sunshine Act. He 
was never prosecuted. However, the plaintiff 
conceded that there was probable cause for 
his arrest for violating a Florida statute 
prohibiting interruptions or disturbances at 
certain public assemblies, because he had 
refused to leave the podium after receiving a 
lawful order to do so. 
 
Ordinarily, such a plaintiff, in order to make 
out a section 1983 First 
Amendment retaliatory arrest claim, would 
only have to allege and prove that this 
impermissible retaliatory motive caused him 
harm, and the defendant would have the 
burden of disproving the absence of but-for 
causation in order to escape liability. Mt. 
Healthy Bd. of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 
274 (1977). But here the city argued that even 
if its motive was impermissible under the 
First Amendment, there was probable cause–
an objective Fourth Amendment standard–to 
arrest the plaintiff anyway, and that this 
constituted a defense to the plaintiff’s First 
Amendment retaliation claim. 
 
In Lozman, the Eleventh Circuit had ruled 
that probable cause was indeed a defense to a 
section 1983 First Amendment retaliatory 
arrest claim. Specifically, it determined that a 
section 1983 retaliatory arrest plaintiff must 
allege and prove not only the retaliatory 
motive but the absence of probable cause as 
well. In other words, the absence of probable 
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cause was an element of the section 1983 
plaintiff’s retaliatory arrest claim. 
 
The Eleventh Circuit’s Reliance 
on Hartman v. Moore 
 
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision was based on 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Hartman v. 
Moore,  547 U.S. 250 (2006), which held that 
for section 1983 retaliatory 
prosecution claims against law enforcement 
officers (prosecutors themselves are 
absolutely immune from damages liability 
for their decision to prosecute), the plaintiff 
must allege and prove not only the 
impermissible motive but the absence of 
probable cause as well. The Court reasoned 
that there was a presumption of prosecutorial 
regularity that the section 1983 plaintiff must 
overcome as an element of his retaliatory 
prosecution case. Accordingly, as a matter of 
section 1983 statutory interpretation and 
policy (but not of constitutional law), the 
plaintiff should have this twin burden in 
retaliatory prosecution cases. 
 
The Court in Hartman explained that 
a retaliatory prosecution case was very 
different from the usual First Amendment 
retaliation case that involved a relatively 
clear causal connection between the 
defendant’s impermissible motivation and 
the resulting injury to the plaintiff. It was 
appropriate in such cases to apply the Mt. 
Healthy burden-shift rule under which the 
defendant has the burden of disproving but-
for causation in order to prevail. 
 
As discussed in a prior post, the Court 
previously had a similar First Amendment 
retaliatory arrest issue before it in Reichle v. 
Howards, 566 U.S. 658 (2012). But it 
avoided addressing the merits by ruling for 
the individual defendants on qualified 
immunity grounds. 
 
In my view, as I have argued previously, the 
Court’s decision in Hartman should not be 
applied to First Amendment retaliatory arrest 
cases. The express reason for 
the Hartman rule is that First Amendment 
retaliatory prosecution cases involve a 
presumption of prosecutorial regularity. But 
this reason is clearly inapplicable where there 
is no prosecution and the constitutional 
challenge is to the arrest itself. 
 
Moreover, First Amendment retaliatory 
arrest claims involve the impermissible 
motivation (a subjective inquiry) of law 
enforcement officers irrespective of probable 
cause, which is an objective (could 
have arrested) inquiry. Under this objective 
inquiry, the existence of probable cause 
precludes a Fourth Amendment violation 
based on an arrest even where that arrest is 
grounded on an offense different from the 
offense for which probable cause is deemed 
to be present. This provides a great deal of 
protection for police officers who allegedly 
make arrests in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 
However, if a police officer arrests a person 
for racial reasons, and the claimed injury is 
grounded on those racial reasons, it should 
not matter for the Equal Protection claim–-
even if it would for a Fourth Amendment 
claim–-that the officer had probable cause to 
do so, namely, that the officer could 
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have arrested the plaintiff. This reasoning 
should apply as well to §1983 First 
Amendment retaliatory arrest claims. 
 
It was always questionable whether the Court 
in Hartman should have allowed policy 
considerations to change the usual section 
1983 causation rules in First Amendment 
retaliatory prosecution cases. Regardless, 
that reasoning should most definitely not be 
extended to First Amendment retaliatory 
arrest cases. Such policy considerations as 
are discussed in Hartman are most 
appropriately addressed, if they are to be 
addressed at all, as part of the qualified 
immunity inquiry, not the elements of the 
section 1983 retaliatory arrest claim. 
 
The Supreme Court’s Narrow Decision 
in Lozman 
 
In any event, in Lozman, the Court, in an 
opinion by Justice Kennedy, reversed the 
Eleventh Circuit and ruled that in this 
particular case the plaintiff did not have to 
allege and prove the absence of probable 
cause, and probable cause was not a defense 
to his First Amendment retaliatory arrest 
claim. 
 
Emphasizing the narrowness of its decision, 
the Court pointed out that the plaintiff only 
challenged the lawfulness of his arrest under 
the First Amendment; he did not make an 
equal protection claim. Further, he conceded 
there was probable cause for his arrest, 
namely, that he could have been arrested for 
violating the Florida statute. Thus, the only 
question was whether the existence of 
probable cause barred his First Amendment 
retaliation claim in this case. 
 
The Court went on to observe that the issue 
in First Amendment retaliatory arrest cases 
was whether Mt. 
Healthy or Hartman applied. It addressed 
what it considered to be the strong policy 
arguments on both sides of the issue. The 
Court then determined that resolution of the 
matter would have to wait for another case: 
“For Lozman’s claim is far afield from the 
typical retaliatory arrest claims, and the 
difficulties that might arise if Mt. Healthy is 
applied to the same mine run of arrests made 
by police officers are not present here.” For 
one thing, the plaintiff did not sue the officer 
who made the arrest. For another, since he 
sued the city, he had to allege and prove an 
official policy or custom, which “separates 
Lozman’s claim from the typical retaliatory 
arrest claim.” Moreover, the causation issues 
here were relatively straightforward because 
the plaintiff’s allegations of an official policy 
or custom of retaliation were unrelated to the 
criminal offense for which the arrest was 
made but rather to prior, protected speech. In 
short, the causal connection between the 
alleged animus and the injury would not be 
“weakened by [an official’s] legitimate 
consideration of speech.”(quoting Reichle, 
566 U.S. at 668). 
 
This did not mean that the Lozman plaintiff 
would necessarily win on remand. A jury 
might find that the city did not have a 
retaliatory motive. Or, under Mt. Healthy, the 
city might show that it would have had the 
plaintiff arrested anyway regardless of any 
retaliatory motive. 
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Justice Thomas was the sole dissenter. He 
maintained that the Court had simply made 
up a narrow rule to fit this case. Instead, he 
argued that plaintiffs in First Amendment 
retaliatory arrest cases have the burden of 
pleading and proving the absence of probable 
cause. That is, probable cause “necessarily 
defeats First Amendment retaliatory-arrest 
claims.” Accordingly, the plaintiff should 
lose here. 
 
Comments 
 
The better approach, as indicated above, is to 
apply Mt. Healthy in all retaliatory arrest 
cases. Hartman should be limited to 
retaliatory prosecution cases. Nevertheless, 
after Lozman the question is still open in the 
Supreme Court. This means, among other 
things, the retaliatory arrest individual 
defendants will continue to have a powerful 
qualified immunity argument, namely, that 
the law is not clearly settled even now, 
per Reichle v. Howards. 
 
Note, however, that the Court may yet 
resolve this question in its forthcoming 2018 
Term. On June 28, 2018, it granted certiorari 
in Nieves v. Bartlett, 712 Fed.Appx. 613 (9th 
Cir. 2017)(No.17-1174), to address once 
again whether probable cause is a defense to 
a section 1983 First Amendment retaliatory 
arrest claim. In this unreported decision, the 
Ninth Circuit ruled that probable cause 
is not a defense to First Amendment 
retaliatory arrest damages claims. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
“Fane Lozman Goes to the Supreme Court, Again” 
 
The New Yorker 
 
Jeffrey Toobin 
 
March 2, 2018 
 
It’s mostly a myth that scrappy outsiders 
often find a way to take their cases “all the 
way to the Supreme Court.” Government, big 
business, and criminal matters dominate the 
Justices’ docket. On the other hand, there is 
Fane Lozman, a man often referred to as a 
civic gadfly, from Riviera Beach, Florida. 
He’s managed to get a case before the 
Supreme Court—two of them, actually. 
Lozman’s legal odyssey began when he set 
up an unusual housekeeping arrangement, in 
2002. A former marine and financial trader 
who is now fifty-six years old, Lozman built 
a floating home, sixty feet long by twelve feet 
wide. “The home consisted of a house-like 
plywood structure with French doors on three 
sides,” a Supreme Court opinion later 
described it. “It contained a sitting room, 
bedroom, closet, bathroom, and kitchen, 
along with a stairway leading to a second 
level with office space. An empty bilge space 
underneath the main floor kept it afloat.” 
Lozman had his residence towed to various 
marinas in Florida, until he settled, in 2006, 
in Riviera Beach, which is in tony Palm 
Beach County. At the time, the city was 
hoping to redevelop its marina, and Lozman 
didn’t want to relocate. A nasty fight ensued, 
and the city ultimately took possession of the 
home and later destroyed it. 
The original dispute turned on a fairly 
obscure point of admiralty law: whether 
Lozman’s home fit the definition of a 
“vessel”—specifically, whether it was 
“capable of being used . . . as a means of 
transportation on water.” Lozman had 
originally represented himself in the dispute, 
but he recruited lawyers and students at 
Stanford Law School’s Supreme Court clinic 
to take on his case, and they ultimately won 
it, 7–2, in 2013. According to Justice Stephen 
Breyer’s opinion, “Nothing about Lozman’s 
home suggests that it was designed to any 
practical degree to transport persons or things 
over water.” It had no ability to propel itself, 
and its French doors were not watertight. So, 
in the convoluted way of the case, because 
Lozman’s home was not a vessel, the city 
couldn’t seize it, and he wound up staying 
where he was. 
While Lozman’s first case was working its 
way through the courts, his battles with the 
Riviera Beach City Council continued. The 
Council still wanted to develop the marina 
area, and planned to take it by eminent 
domain. But the Florida legislature had 
passed a law banning the use of eminent 
domain where the property was to be used by 
a private developer—as was the plan in 
Riviera Beach. So the Council called a 
surprise meeting and approved the plan on 
the day before the new law went into effect. 
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Lozman sued, arguing that the public didn’t 
receive sufficient advance notice of the 
meeting. The city ultimately dropped its 
redevelopment plan, but not its efforts to boot 
Lozman from his boat. 
In the midst of these struggles, on November 
15, 2006, the City Council held a meeting that 
included, as was customary, a period for open 
comment, when citizens could address the 
Council on issues of their choice for three 
minutes apiece. Lozman began speaking 
about municipal corruption, and, within a few 
seconds, a Council member told a police 
officer to “carry him out.” While a video 
camera rolled, Lozman was then arrested, 
handcuffed, and taken to a holding cell at the 
local police station. He was later released, 
and no charges were filed, but Lozman sued 
the city for violation of his First Amendment 
rights. It was this case that wound up before 
the Supreme Court on Tuesday morning. 
Lozman had an unusual problem before the 
Justices: his case was too good. Every Justice 
who spoke seemed to acknowledge that 
Lozman’s rights had been violated. As Chief 
Justice John Roberts put it, “I found the video 
pretty chilling. I mean, the fellow is up there 
for about fifteen seconds, and the next thing 
he knows he’s being led off in handcuffs, 
speaking in a very calm voice the whole time. 
Now, the Council may not have liked what he 
was talking about, but that doesn’t mean they 
get to cuff him and lead him out.” Still, 
several Justices worried that the egregious 
facts of Lozman’s case might lead them to 
create a standard that would subject many 
communities to similar lawsuits. They 
needed to figure out how to create a standard 
that would not discourage law enforcement 
from keeping order in public meetings, while 
preventing the kind of abuse that Lozman 
suffered. “I’m very concerned about police 
officers in difficult situations,” Justice 
Anthony Kennedy told Pamela Karlan, a 
Stanford Law professor who was 
representing Lozman. “In this case, there’s a 
very serious contention that people in elected 
office deliberately wanted to intimidate this 
person, and it seems to me that maybe in this 
case we should cordon off or box off what 
happened here from the ordinary conduct of 
police officers.” 
After the arguments, the outcome of the case 
seemed in doubt, but Lozman was serene as 
he held court on the marble steps of the 
Supreme Court building. (He’s a veteran of 
such moments, after all.) Standing a regal six 
feet four inches, and wearing a well-cut black 
suit, Lozman said that he was looking 
forward to returning to Florida. “I just want 
to enjoy the fruits of my labor,” he said. But 
there was one more business venture on his 
mind. “I’m planning on building a 
modernistic stilt-home community on the 
water,” he said. Who could object to that? 
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“Argument preview: Justices to consider whether probable cause defeats claims of 
retaliatory arrest for First-Amendment-protected expression” 
 
 
SCOTUS Blog 
 
Heidi Kitrosser 
 
February 21, 2018 
 
On November 15, 2006, Fane Lozman rose to 
speak during the public-comments portion of 
a regular public meeting of the City Council 
of Riviera Beach, Florida. What followed 
was anything but a run-of-the-mill discussion 
about the intricacies of local government. To 
the contrary, when Lozman began to talk 
about “corrupt local politician[s],” he was cut 
off by a councilperson and asked to cease that 
line of commentary. When Lozman refused 
to comply, he was arrested, handcuffed and 
removed from the meeting. 
 
In February 2008, Lozman filed a Section 
1983 suit against Riviera Beach in the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida. He alleged, among other things, that 
his arrest constituted retaliation for First-
Amendment–protected activity. Specifically, 
Lozman charged that his arrest amounted to 
payback for two categories of protected 
expression: his then-pending lawsuit against 
the city under Florida’s Sunshine Act, and his 
extensive public criticisms of city officials 
and policies, including and preceding his 
remarks on November 15. 
 
After a jury returned a verdict for the city, 
Lozman sought a new trial, which the district 
court denied, and he filed an unsuccessful 
appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
11th Circuit. The 11th Circuit acknowledged 
Lozman’s “compelling” argument that the 
district court had given erroneous jury 
instructions on retaliatory animus. The court 
of appeals held, however, that any such error 
was harmless, because the jury had found that 
the arresting officer had probable cause to 
arrest Lozman. The court relied on an earlier 
11th Circuit case, Dahl v. Holley, which held 
that a plaintiff cannot prevail on a First 
Amendment retaliatory arrest claim if there 
was probable cause to justify the arrest. 
 
On Tuesday, February 27, the Supreme Court 
will consider whether the 11th Circuit was 
correct in holding that the presence of 
probable cause necessarily defeats a claim of 
retaliatory arrest for First-Amendment-
protected expression. In 2006, in Hartman v. 
Moore, the Supreme Court held that probable 
cause bars First Amendment claims alleging 
retaliatory prosecution. The court has yet to 
determine, however, whether to extend 
the Hartman rule (the “probable-cause bar”) 
to the retaliatory-arrest setting. Although the 
2012 case Reichle v. Howards presented that 
very question, the court resolved Reichle on 
the narrower grounds of qualified immunity. 
Currently, the federal courts of appeals are 
split on the issue. 
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In urging the Supreme Court not to extend the 
probable-cause bar to retaliatory-arrest 
claims, Lozman argues that there are key 
distinctions between the prosecution and 
arrest settings. In this vein, he 
characterizes Hartman as having “rest[ed] 
entirely on the fact that prosecutors … are 
absolutely immune from suit.” Given this 
immunity, a retaliatory-prosecution claim 
necessarily entails a representation that a 
non-prosecuting official induced a prosecutor 
to conduct a prosecution for retaliatory 
reasons. To prevail in such a case, when there 
is probable cause to support the grounds 
officially given for prosecution, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate that the official grounds 
are distinct from the prosecutor’s subjective, 
retaliatory motives. Such a showing 
necessarily entails a complicated causal 
chain. More importantly, the process of 
identifying and litigating over that chain 
undermines the prosecutorial independence 
and corollary “‘presumption of 
[prosecutorial] regularity’” that immunity is 
meant to protect. In contrast, Lozman 
maintains, the causal chain is relatively 
“straightforward” in the retaliatory-arrest 
setting. Additionally, he posits that “no 
potentially responsible actor” in that setting 
is beyond scrutiny. 
 
Lozman also argues that a probable-cause bar 
poses far greater risks to First Amendment 
interests in the retaliatory-arrest context than 
in the retaliatory-prosecution context. In the 
prosecution setting, “the putative plaintiff 
will have an indictment or charging 
instrument that cabins the probable cause 
inquiry by identifying a specific crime.” Yet 
“in retaliation cases involving arrests, the 
‘subjective reason for making the arrest need 
not,’” under Devenpeck v. Alford, “‘be the 
criminal offense as to which the known facts 
provide probable cause.’” A probable-cause 
bar in the arrest setting thus immunizes state 
actors who cause arrests to be made in 
retaliation for protected speech, so long as 
they can show that there was probable cause 
to arrest the speaker for jaywalking, 
speeding, disturbing the peace or committing 
any criminal violation at all. 
 
To illustrate the potential for abuse, Lozman 
points to the facts of his own case. Shortly 
after his arrest, Lozman was given a “notice 
to appear” that listed two charges: 
“disorderly conduct” and “resisting arrest 
without violence.” Both charges were soon 
dismissed by the state’s attorney, who found 
“no reasonable likelihood” that they could be 
prosecuted with success. At the trial in 
Lozman’s Section 1983 suit, the question 
resurfaced as to whether there had been 
probable cause to arrest him for a crime. The 
trial court judge concluded that no probable 
cause had existed to arrest him for either 
charging offense. The city then “identified 
two new candidates” for provisions that 
Lozman might have violated: a prohibition 
on “‘trespass after warning’” and a law 
against “‘willfully interrupt[ing] or 
disturb[ing] any school or any assembly of 
people met for the worship of God or for any 
lawful purpose.’” After initially leaning 
toward the trespass provision, the district 
court settled on the willful-disturbance law as 
the one “at play here.” Ultimately, the latter 
offense was the only one “as to which the jury 
was asked to assess probable cause.” 
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For its part, the city denies that there are 
meaningful, material distinctions between the 
retaliatory-arrest and retaliatory-prosecution 
settings. It maintains that each type of claim 
presents the same fundamental causality 
problem: “[S]omething other than 
[retaliatory] animus – the prosecutor’s 
independent decision to prosecute, or the 
officer’s decision to arrest for reasons 
unrelated to animus toward the arrestee’s 
speech – may have led to the supposed 
retaliatory action.” Nor do retaliatory arrests 
threaten free-speech interests any more than 
do retaliatory prosecutions. If anything, the 
opposite is true, because a “criminal 
prosecution is a far greater intrusion on a 
defendant’s liberty than an arrest.” The city 
also dismisses the notion that the arrest 
setting is comparatively rife with the 
potential for government abuse of the 
probable-cause bar. “Rarely,” the city notes, 
“is an officer who harbors some ill will 
towards a speaker present at the exact 
moment the speaker does something that 
gives probable cause for an arrest.” And in 
any event, “arrests backed by probable cause 
pose little danger to the freedom of speech.” 
Far greater threats are posed by “arrests 
unsupported by probable cause.” 
 
The city also stresses the practical value of 
the probable-cause bar in the retaliatory-
arrest setting. The city observes that “officers 
must often consider protected speech when 
deciding whether to make an arrest.” For 
example, speech might “provide ‘evidence of 
a crime.’” Or it might influence an officer’s 
assessment of whether a suspect threatens 
public safety. With a probable-cause bar in 
place, officers can “make arrests in such 
circumstances without fear of having to later 
litigate whether their real motivation was 
preventing [crime] or punishing speech.” To 
illustrate this point, the city highlights the 
example of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
9th Circuit, which does not impose a 
probable-cause bar. The city summarizes a 
number of retaliatory-arrest cases that went 
to trial in the 9th Circuit, and suggests that 
they lacked merit. 
 
Among the questions to watch for from the 
justices are those designed to tease out the 
practical dangers each party’s position might 
pose. For example, the city might be asked to 
grapple with scenarios in which government 
officers intentionally and openly retaliate 
against protestors for their protected speech 
by targeting those people for aggressive 
enforcement of laws against minor 
transgressions, such as jaywalking. 
Lozman’s attorney might be pushed, on the 
other hand, to consider the limits of a 
complainant’s ability to state a claim for 
retaliatory arrest based on speech that is 
protected but that may show violent impulses 
on the speaker’s part. It will be interesting as 
well to see to what extent, if at all, the 
justices’ questions reflect recent events, such 
as the demonstrations and violence in 
Charlottesville, Virginia, protests against 
President Donald Trump’s administration, 
and protests by Black Lives Matter. And of 
course, we can count on old First 
Amendment chestnuts like the chilling effect 
and the heightened value of “core” political 
speech to crop up throughout the discussion. 
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“Supreme Court Could Continue First Amendment Charge” 
 
 
Bloomberg Law 
 
Kimberly Robinson 
 
August 8, 2018 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has seemingly taken 
it easy on free speech cases after last term’s 
First Amendment bonanza. 
OT 2017—as last term is known by court 
watchers—had five cases that touched on 
free speech, all of which were high-profile. 
The most explosive was Janus v. AFSCME, 
in which Justice Elena Kagan accused the 5-
4 majority of “weaponizing the First 
Amendment, in a way that unleashes judges, 
now and in the future, to intervene in 
economic and regulatory policy.” 
She warned of a future in which “black-robed 
rulers” would override citizens’ choices. 
Decisions like Janus “invite conservative 
legal activists to keep pushing far-reaching 
First Amendment claims,” David Gans, of 
the progressive Constitution Accountability 
Center, Washington, told Bloomberg Law. 
“There are not any cases involving such 
claims on the Court’s docket for next Term 
so far,” Gans said. 
But there are some waiting in the wings. 
And in “the years to come, we are likely to 
see a new suite of First Amendment claims in 
the context of unions and labor law, 
disclosure, and campaign finance,” Gans 
said. 
Next Term 
Nearly 10 percent of the court’s docket last 
term touched on the First Amendment, but so 
far next term has only one. And the issue is 
strikingly similar to one the court heard last 
term, Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach. 
At issue in Nieves v. Bartlett is whether 
probable cause defeats a First Amendment 
retaliatory claim. That’s nearly identical to 
the question presented in Lozman. 
But the court stressed in Lozman that the 
inquiry was very fact specific. So Nieves 
doesn’t seem like it will break a lot of new 
First Amendment ground. 
There are, however, other hot-button speech 
cases waiting to be granted by the justices. 
Those include: 
 Cosby v. Dickinson, a defamation 
case against actor Bill Cosby related 
to rape allegations; 
 Keister v. Bell, about permitting 
requirements for campus speech; and 
 Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 
asking what kind of free speech rights 
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teachers and coaches have while 
around students. The speech at issue 
in Kennedy involves a coach’s 
prayers—in the presence of 
students—before high school football 
games. 
Compulsory Bar Membership 
None of those free speech cases, however, 
would have the implications threatened by 
Kagan: slicing down popular legislation via a 
robust reading of the First Amendment. 
But two cases pending before the court have 
that potential. 
Fleck v. Wetch is a challenge to North 
Dakota’s mandatory bar association 
requirement for attorneys. Similar to the 
argument in Janus, the petitioner 
there says that he can’t be compelled to 
subsidize speech he disagrees with. 
The Supreme Court previously held that 
compulsory bar membership could be 
squared with the First Amendment if the 
“expenditures are necessarily reasonably 
incurred for the purpose of regulating the 
legal profession or improving the quality of 
legal services.” 
The petitioner argues that the First 
Amendment landscape has shifted and that 
the court’s previous ruling should be 
overruled. 
Net Neutrality 
The Supreme Court also has before it a series 
of cases regarding the Federal 
Communication Commission’s now-defunct 
net neutrality rules. 
Under the Obama administration, the FCC 
issued an order requiring internet service 
providers to treat all information the same 
regardless of the source. 
The D.C. Circuit rejected a challenge to that 
order in 2016. 
In refusing to reconsider that decision in 
front of the full D.C. Circuit back in 2017, the 
court rejected the suggestion that the First 
Amendment barred such regulation of 
internet service providers. Judge Brett 
Kavanaugh, who President Donald Trump 
has nominated to the Supreme Court, 
dissented from the decision not to rehear the 
case, saying that the First Amendment “bars 
the Government from restricting the editorial 
discretion of Internet service providers.” 
A finding in line with Kavanaugh’s view 
would arm internet service providers “with a 
First Amendment shield against net neutrality 
obligations,” Judge Sri Srinivasan said. 
Several parties petitioned the Supreme Court 
for review in 2017. But the cases have stalled 
in the high court, likely due to political 
developments. 
The FCC under the Trump repealed the net 
neutrality rules in late 2017, and the repeal 
went into effect in June. 
The federal government Aug. 2 asked the 
high court to vacate the lower court’s ruling 
as a result. 
In May, however, the Senate voted 52-47 
to overturn the FCC’s repeal in a resolution 
under the Congressional Review Act. The 
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resolution is waiting on action in the U.S. 
House of Representatives. 
Should net neutrality supporters succeed in 
their uphill battle to get the CRA passed in 
the House, all eyes would turn to the Supreme 
Court. 
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